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I Articles I
A Life in the Balance: Is There a Right
to Plead Guilty Even If It Is to Avoid the
Death Penalty?
H. Mitchell Caldwell* and Anthony X.
McDermott**
I. Introduction
Is there a right to plead guilty? More specifically, once an
accused is charged with a crime does that person have the right to
plead guilty to the crime as charged at any time in the proceedings?
To Kurt Michaels the answer to this seemingly straight forward,
even simplistic question is a matter of life or death.'
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. Professor
Caldwell is appointed counsel for Kurt Michaels in the automatic appeal of his
death sentence to the California Supreme Court.
** Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. The authors are
indebted to Christopher Bridges, Pepperdine University School of Law, Class of
2000, for the excellent research assistance that he provided on this article.
1. If the court had accepted Kurt Michaels guilty plea, the court would have
been limited to sentencing Michaels to a prison term of twenty-five years to life.
Because the court rejected the plea, Michaels stood trial and eventually was
sentenced to death.
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On the date set for his preliminary hearing on murder and
burglary charges, Michaels was escorted into court where he was
joined by his attorney. However, instead of submitting to a
preliminary examination, Michaels offered a fully executed guilty
plea to the murder charge pending against him.2 Michaels's action
caught the court by surprise. The prosecutor, who had been
contemplating filing special circumstances and thus escalating the
case against Michaels to death penalty status, was also taken aback.3
The magistrate, at the urging of the prosecutor, took a strategic
recess.4 When court reconvened, the prosecutor tendered a hastily
prepared, amended complaint charging special circumstances.5
Michaels's attorney strenuously insisted that the magistrate must
reject the amended complaint and instead accept Michaels's plea to
the initial complaint.6 The magistrate, after considerable indecision,
rejected Michaels's plea and allowed the amended complaint to be
filed.7
This remarkable turn of events was set in motion two months
earlier when Michaels and another man entered a woman's
apartment and murdered her.8 Michaels was arrested two weeks
2. See Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Dec. 6 & 8, 1988, at 28, People v.
Popik, Paulk, and Michaels, San Diego Municipal Court, CR N14859 [hereinafter
"Transcript"]-
3. See id. "I don't think this is a timely change of plea. It is a ruse on the
court and the District Attorney and the community." Id.
4. See id. at 28-29. "You will have a few moments to see if you can discover
some law to give me that says that it is not a matter of right for a defendant to
change his plea and plead guilty to the face of the complaint as it is pled against
him at any time during the proceedings. I believe they have that right. You will
have to convince me that they do not. We will take a brief recess...." Id.
5. See id. at 33. "We have an amended complaint prepared and presented to
me. It alleges that the murder occurred while lying in wait, a violation of Penal
Code Section 190.2(A)(15). That it was committed by the defendants who were
engaged or were an accomplice to the commission of a first-degree burglary, in
violation of Penal Code Section 190.2(A)(17)(VII). It also alleged it was carried
out for financial gain, in violation of Penal Code Section 190.2(A)(1)." Id.
6. See id. at 35-36. "[Bjefore the People tried to file their amended
complaint, my client had already proffered his change of plea and asked to be
allowed to plead guilty. I would urge the court to consider the fact that he is
allowed to plead at any stage of the proceeding and he had attempted in good faith
to plead prior to the filing of any amended complaint. I would urge, as a matter of
right, he has the right to plead before such amended complaint."
7. See Transcript supra note 2, at 29-32.
8. See Respondent's Brief to the California Supreme Court, at 3, 6-14, People
v. Michaels, S016924 (describing how Kurt Michaels and his accomplices entered
the home of JoAnn Clemons, the mother of Kurt's girlfriend, Christina, and killed
her in retribution for the years of abuse the deceased had inflicted on Christina)
[hereinafter "Respondent's Brief"].
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later and subsequently confessed to the killing.9 On October 4,
1988, the office of the San Diego District Attorney filed a complaint
charging Michaels with murder and burglary. ° The complaint did
not specify whether the murder charge was in the first or second
degree, nor did it allege any special circumstances that would make
Michaels eligible for the death penalty." At his October 19, 1988,
arraignment, Michaels pled "not guilty" to both charges. 2 At a bail
review hearing on October 31, the prosecutor sought and received a
"no-bail" status based on his representation that special circum-
stances allegations might be later added to the complaint.13 And
again on November 18, at a readiness hearing, the prosecution
reiterated the possibility of amending the complaint to include
special circumstances allegations.14 However, no amendment was
offered."5
On December 6, 1988, the date set for the preliminary hearing,
counsel for Michaels offered a fully executed change of plea to
guilty as to the murder count. 6  The prosecutor urged the
magistrate to refuse the plea and allow him to amend the complaint
to add special circumstances allegations. 7 Over adamant objections
from Michaels's counsel,'8 the magistrate rejected the plea and
allowed the prosecutor to amend the complaint to charge murder in
the first degree with special circumstances allegations. 9 A plea to
9. See id. at 14 (describing the incidents surrounding the October 17, 1988,
arrest of Kurt Michaels at a carnival grounds in El Cajon, California).
10. See id. at 1 (detailing the counts).
11. See id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2.
12. See Transcript supra note 2, at 3-4.
13. See id. at 4.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 28.
17. See Transcript supra note 2, at 28.
18. See supra note 6.
19. See Transcript supra note 2, at 32.
I have decided that I would permit the People to prepare an amended
complaint and present it to the court for filing and make a motion to file
the amended complaint, which would charge special circumstances. I
would ask for an offer of proof, a factual basis for the special
circumstances, and if I felt it sufficient, I would grant the request and
permit the filing of the amended complaint. If I did not find the factual
basis for the allegations for special circumstances to be adequate, then I
would not permit the filing of the amended complaint. Then, if I did not
permit the filing of the amended complaint, the question becomes do I
accept the change of plea from [Michaels]. And in my mind and to my
knowledge, the defendant has the right to plead guilty to the face of the
complaint at any time in the proceedings. However, he does not have the
right as a matter of law to plead to a lesser-included offense. By the
2000]
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murder, even if found to be murder in the first degree, carried a
sentence of twenty-five years to life;2" whereas if the jury convicted
Michaels of the first degree murder and found even one of the
special circumstances allegations true, Michaels would be sentenced
to death or life in prison without the possibility of parole.21
Michaels refused to enter a plea to the amended complaint.22
Consequently, the magistrate entered a plea of "not guilty" and a
denial of the special circumstances allegations on Michaels's
behalf.23  Michaels stood trial on the amended charges and
allegations and was subsequently sentenced to death.24
This scenario draws into contrast the competing goals of a
defendant's right to plead guilty to the crime for which that person
is charged and a prosecutor's discretion to charge the defendant
with the crime most accurately reflecting his or her conduct. 25 Does
it defy statutory and judicial authority as well as common sense to
maintain that one charged with a crime does not have the right to
plead to the crime as charged? After all, it is the prosecutor who
reviews the case and makes an informed filing decision. Once so
initiated doesn't it follow that the accused can own up to the
accusations and plead guilty? On the other hand, isn't it in society's
best interest to allow prosecutors broad discretion in their filing
decisions and in the subsequent amendment of those filing
decisions? Surely, a system that would require prosecutors to file
the most serious charge simply to protect against an early plea to a
lesser charge is flawed. Tempered filing decisions are critical.
nature of the laws of the pleading, Count One alleges a violation of Penal
Code Section 187 and does not state whether it is first or second-degree
murder. By law, if I permit a plea to the count as it is stated, it is second
degree, because when you don't know whether it is first or second-for
instance, in murder or burglary, if you don't know when you take the
plea, by law it becomes the lesser offense. I do not have to accept the
plea to a lesser offense of second-degree burglary, unless the People
agree to that plea.
Id. at 32-33.
20. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 1999). If Michaels was found guilty of
second-degree murder, he faced a sentence of fifteen years to life. See id.
21. See id. § 190.2.
22. See Transcript supra note 2, at 40-41.
23. See id. at 41.
24. See Respondent's Brief supra note 8, at 2 (setting forth the dates and
details of the 1990 trial at which Kurt Michaels was found guilty of murder and the
special circumstances allegations were found true). Michaels's automatic appeal of
all convictions and the judgment of death is currently pending before the
California Supreme Court. The Court is expected to rule on the appeal in 2000.
25. For a general discussion of prosecutorial discretion, see infra, notes 174 to
209 and accompanying text.
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What of changed circumstances? 26  What of newly developed
facts?27 What of dubious defense tactics? 28 How are they to be
factored in? Must the prosecutor hasten on learning new facts to
amend the charges and thereby prevent the accused from pleading
to the original charge?
As the stakes escalate to those cases with death penalty
implications, it may well be that the decision to file special
circumstances allegations should not be made at the earlier phases
of a case. In potential death penalty cases, perhaps the decision to
file capital charges should not be made until after a preliminary
hearing or a grand jury review.29  The preliminary hearing and
grand jury process allow the prosecutor a "dry run" of the case to
assess critical witnesses and evidence and to gather a sense of how
the witnesses and evidence may play out during the trial.'
Moreover, delaying the ultimate filing decision in potential death
penalty cases allows for ongoing investigation that may develop
facts and circumstances that could significantly impact the filing
decision.31 In such instances a measured "wait and see what
26. It is possible to conceive of a variety of scenarios that may cause the
prosecution to reevaluate its initial filing decision. For example, what of the
situation where the defendant kills one victim and causes great bodily injury to a
second. In these situations, it could certainly be argued that, while it was
inappropriate for the prosecution to file death penalty charges at the outset of the
case, the filing of such charges would certainly be warranted if and when the
second victim dies.
27. Again, one can conceive of numerous scenarios where newly developed
facts might warrant the amendment of the charging document to include special
circumstances allegations. For example, one such situation might arise where, late
in the investigation, facts come to light to show that the crime was committed for
hire, or in the commission of a robbery, or that the victim was repeatedly raped
either before or after the murder. In these circumstances, surely the prosecutor
would be justified in seeking the death penalty.
28. See infra notes 68 to 86 and accompanying text.
29. This course of action intuitively would allow the prosecutor to assess more
fully the case's weaknesses and strengths and the equities involved before taking
the drastic step of filing special circumstances allegations. From a policy
standpoint, this course of action surely must be preferred over having prosecutors
overcharging the death penalty at the initial stages of homicide cases in order to
circumvent "best-interest" pleas by defendants seeking to avoid the death penalty.
30. In cases where the prosecution is contemplating the filing of death penalty
charges, the preliminary hearing provides a forum whereby the prosecution can
find out if its case has any fatal weaknesses. In such a case, the prosecution can
elect not to seek the death penalty and thereby save a lot of money that would
otherwise have to be spent and also alleviate some of the pressures on counsel, the
courts, and the defendant that are necessarily attendant to death penalty cases.
31. Indeed, many of the facts that give rise to special circumstances allegations
may not be discovered until the later stages of the criminal investigation. As such,
the prosecution should not be barred from adding these allegations at a later stage
in the process. Furthermore, as sound policy, the prosecution also should not be
200]
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develops" approach may be the prudent course of action. Indeed, if
there is any type of case that compels the most careful of
deliberations, it is one with death penalty implications.
These competing dynamics are escalated in situations such as
that which occurred with Kurt Michaels. The prosecutor's initial
decision was not to file death qualifying charges. Rather, the
prosecutor opted to continue assessing the case up to and including
the preliminary hearing before making such a critical decision.32
Only at the time of the abortive plea did the prosecutor allege
special circumstances. Generally, amending the charges presents
no problems because the prosecutor has virtually an unlimited right
to amend the charging document up to and including the time of
trial.33 However, the Michaels scenario pinpoints the issue of
whether the prosecutor's seemingly unlimited right to charge and to
amend charging documents is cut off by a defendant's guilty plea.
Or conversely, does the accused have a right to plead guilty to the
pending charges?
It is the goal of this article to raise and examine two questions.
First, is there a right to plead guilty? Second, assuming such a right
exists, does it apply in cases where the prosecution attempts to
amend the charge to seek the death penalty? We will examine the
limited statutory and case authority as they relate to an accused's
right to plead guilty, focusing particularly on California law but
with a comparative review from other jurisdictions as well. 3'
Implicit in this analysis is an examination of the competing policy
goals of the prosecution's discretion in charging and the accused's
right to plead. Specifically, as they are related to potential capital
cases, should death-qualifying charges be filed initially or should
the decision whether to seek the death penalty be delayed to
maximize the time for the investigation? In the Michaels case, the
San Diego District Attorney opted for the latter and delayed the
decision, wanting to assess the strength of the case against Michaels
at the preliminary hearing prior to making the final filing decision.35
required to file prematurely special circumstances allegations at a time when the
known facts may not so warrant.
32. See supra notes 10 to 19 and accompanying text.
33. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1009 (West Supp. 2000). A postponement must
be granted if the amendment prejudices substantial rights of the defendant. See id.
Furthermore, the indictment or accusation cannot be amended to change the
offense charged or to charge an offense not shown by evidence taken at the
preliminary hearing. See id.
34. See infra notes 102 to 159 and accompanying text.
35. See supra notes 10 to 19 and accompanying text.
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It is undisputed that prosecutorial discretion is essential within
the American criminal justice system.36 But, it is also undisputed
that the discretion has limits. As set forth above,37 those limits can
from time to time be exceeded. Kurt Michaels's plea on December
6, 1988 before Judge Burley brought into sharp focus the limits of
that discretion. The Michaels scenario may well represent an
attempt by a prosecutor to reach beyond the permissible limits.
So the question then remains: when is the right to plead guilty
abrogated? The answer to this seemingly fundamental question
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.38 Some jurisdictions do not
seem to address the question at all. Among those that explicitly
deal with this important issue, the answer is not always clear.
II. Is There a Right to Plead Guilty?
Section 859a(a) of the California Penal Code provides in
pertinent part:
If the public offense charged is a felony not punishable with
death,3 9 the magistrate shall immediately upon the appearance of
counsel for the defendant read the complaint to the defendant
and ask him or her whether he or she pleads guilty or not guilty
to the offense charged therein and to a previous conviction or
convictions of crime if charged. While the charge remains
pending before the magistrate and when the defendant's counsel
is present, the defendant may plead guilty to the offense charged,
or, with the consent of the magistrate and the district attorney
or other counsel for the people, plead nolo contendere to the
offense charged or plead guilty or nolo contendere to any other
offense the commission of which is necessarily included in that
with which he or she is charged and to the previous conviction
36. See infra notes 178 to 216 and accompanying text.
37. See supra notes 1 to 33 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 102 to 159 and accompanying text.
39. It could be argued that any murder charge is a felony punishable with
death up until the point at which the prosecution is precluded from amending the
charging document to include death-qualifying charges. However, California's
statutory scheme limits the use of the term "punishable with death" to those
situations where death-qualifying charges have been alleged. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190(a) (West 1999) ("Every person guilty of murder in the first degree
shall suffer death, confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of
parole, or confinement in the state prison for a term of 25 years to life. The
penalty to be applied shall be determined as provided in Sections 190.1, 190.2,
190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.").
2000]
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or convictions of crime if charged upon a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere .... 40
Penal Code Section 859a(a) reads quite plainly and confirms
the common sense notion that, except for capital cases,4l the
accused has the right to plead guilty to the crime as charged.42
Therefore, under California's statutory scheme, a plea of guilty is
the equivalent of a conviction of the crime.4'3 All allegations of the
offense are admitted by such a plea. 4 Likewise, the California
appellate courts have read Penal Code Section 859a(a) to mean that
a guilty plea is a conclusive admission of guilt and of every element
constituting the offense charged; it is no less than a confession to
every fact giving rise to the charge(s) contained in the pleading.45 It
then follows that a defendant may plead guilty to all charges [save
capital charges] without prosecutorial consent and, when he does
so, all that remains is the pronouncement of judgment and
sentencing.46  Capital charges are specifically exempted from
Section 859a(a). 7 However, if no capital charges have been filed
against the defendant, there is no requirement that the prosecutor
consent to the guilty plea.' With a guilty plea, the accused has
terminated the prosecutor's right to amend the charges.49
California Penal Code Section 859a(a) mandates that the
accused has an absolute right to plead guilty to the crime as
charged. ° However, under the plain language of Penal Code
Section 859a(a), a guilty plea to a lesser included offense, or even to
a related but different offense, may be rejected either by the
40. Id. § 859a(a) (emphasis added).
41. In California, the only felony punishable by death is murder where special
circumstances allegations have been found true. See id. § 190.2.
42. See id.
43. See Arenstein v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 265 Cal. App. 2d 179
(Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016, subd. 1 (West Supp. 2000); People v.
Superior Court (Smith), 82 Cal. App. 3d 909 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
47. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 859a(a). While capital charges are specifically
exempt from the scheme set forth in section 859a(a), the statute does not address
the situation where special circumstances allegations might later be added. See id.
48. See id. §§ 859a(a), 1009.
49. It should be noted, however, that a plea of nolo contendere does not affect
the prosecutor's ability to amend the charges. Because § 859a(a) specifically
requires prosecutorial consent for a nolo contendere plea, if the prosecutor wishes
to amend the charging document prior to the entry of such a plea, all the
prosecutor has to do in order to circumvent the defendant's pleading rights is
withhold consent. See id. § 859a(a).
50. See id. § 859a(a).
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magistrate or the prosecution.1 The accused has no right to change
or alter the charges against him. However, it seems equally
fundamental that the accused can plead to the charges pending
against him as they were brought by the prosecution. Given that
the prosecution made the decision as to which charges to file
against the defendant, it is axiomatic that the accused in pleading is
simply reacting to the prosecution's lead.
Despite the seemingly clear mandate of Penal Code Section
859a(a), exceptions to the requirement that a magistrate must
accept a validly proffered plea have been created or recognized by
the California courts. It should be noted, however, that such
exceptions have been applied in very limited circumstances. The
seminal cases in California are People v. Hall,2 Cronk v. Municipal
Court,53 and People v. Reza.-
In People v. Hall,55 the defendant was charged with robbery,56
with being an ex-felon in possession of a concealed firearm,57 and
with use of a firearm. 8 The defendant (Hall) "offered to stipulate
that he was an ex-felon and that he would be guilty of violating
Section 12021 if the jury found that he possessed a firearm during
the commission of the robberies."59 Hall then moved to exclude any
mention of his prior convictions.' The prosecution refused to
accept the stipulation and the trial court denied Hall's motion.61
The trial court also denied Hall's motions to delete any reference to
51. See id.
52. 616 P.2d 826 (Cal. 1980), overruled by People v. Newman, 981 P.2d 98
(Cal. 1999).
53. 138 Cal. App. 3d 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
54. 152 Cal. App. 3d 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
55. 616 P.2d 826, overruled by Newman, 981 P.2d 98. Newman only overruled
Hall to the extent that the latter required defendants be advised of their Boykin-
Tahl rights before a stipulation as to the existence of prior felony convictions could
properly be accepted by the court. This language, as found in footnote 9 of the
Hall decision, was held by Newman to be dictum and at odds with the California
Supreme Court's reasoning in People v. Adams, 862 P.2d 831, 836 (Cal. 1993). See
Newman, 981 P.2d at 104 n.6 ("We expressly disavow the contrary dictum set forth
in Hall, supra, [ ], footnote 9, and, to the extent they are inconsistent with the
conclusion set forth in this opinion, the decisions of the Courts of Appeal in
Robertson [ ] and Turner [ ] are disapproved.") (citations omitted).
56. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 1999).
57. See id. § 12021.
5& See id. § 12022.5; People v. Hall, 616 P.2d at 826 (Cal. 1980).





the nature of his previous convictions and to sever the Section
12021 charge from the robberies.62
The California Supreme Court determined that it was error for
the trial court to allow evidence on an issue to which the defendant
was willing to stipulate unless that evidence retains some probative
value.63 Because Hall's prior convictions had no probative value
other than to prove the Section 12021 violation, the trial court
should have excluded any mention of the defendant's prior
convictions.6 The court held that if a defendant offers to admit the
existence of an element of a charged offense, the prosecution and
trial court must accept that offer.6 ' However, the court determined
that the error was not prejudicial and thus affirmed Hall's
conviction.66
It should be noted, however, that two years after Hall, the
voters of California passed Proposition 8.67 One of the results of the
passage of Proposition 8 was the enactment of the current Section
28 of Article 1 of the California Constitution. Subsection (f) of
Section 28 reads:
(f) Use of Prior Convictions. Any prior felony conviction of
any person in any criminal proceeding, whether adult or
juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for
purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any
criminal proceeding. When a prior felony conviction is an
element of any felony offense, it shall be proven to the trier of
fact in open court.
6
1
Thus, the California Constitution has abrogated Hall, but only to
the extent that the ruling applies to the use of prior felony
convictions.69
62. See id.
63. See id. at 831.
64. See Hall, 616 P.2d at 831.
65. See id. at 836.
66. See id.
67. See Victims' Bill of Rights, Initiative Measure Proposition 8 (approved
June 8, 1982) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 28; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25,
667, 1191.1, 1192.7, 3043 (West 1999); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1732.5, 1767,
6331 (West Supp. 1998)).
68. CAL. CONST. art. 26, subs. f.
69. See People v. Reza, 152 Cal. App. 3d 647, 654 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that "Proposition [8] only reaches that portion of the Hall line of authority
relating to crimes which contain a prior conviction as an element .... )-
Proposition 8 notwithstanding, Hall continues to stand for the proposition that
once a defendant offers to stipulate to the existence of an element of a charged
offense, the prosecution and court have no discretion and must accept that
stipulation. See Hall, 28 Cal. 3d at 152.
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The 1982 case of Cronk v. Municipal Court involved dubious
defense tactics.0 In Cronk, the State filed a felony complaint
charging Cronk with murder.7 The complaint did not specify the
degree of murder.72 When Cronk appeared before the magistrate
on July 17, 1981, counsel was appointed and the magistrate set the
arraignment for July 24 . On July 20, without notice to the district
attorney, defendant's counsel filed an ex parte application
requesting that the arraignment be advanced to July 21 .
The arraignment was advanced and, on July 21, Cronk
appeared with counsel and attempted to plead guilty as charged to
the complaint.75 The prosecutor was taken by surprise and moved
to dismiss 6. 7 The prosecutor represented that since the time that the
complaint was initially filed, additional evidence had come to light
which now warranted the filing of special circumstances
allegations.77 The prosecutor stated that he was not aware until
earlier that very day that Cronk was in local custody and due to be
arraigned. At the insistence of the prosecutor and over the
strenuous objection of Cronk, the magistrate continued the matter
for one day to allow the filing of an amended complaint charging
murder in the first degree with special circumstances allegations.79
Throughout the proceedings, Cronk and his counsel insisted
that, pursuant to Penal Code Section 859a(a), the magistrate was
mandated to accept Cronk's guilty plea.' The California Court of
Appeal disagreed and held:
Though Penal Code Section 859a, [subdivision] (a) appears with
a reasonable construction to be mandatory, there are certain
exceptions to this mandatory language.... If the defense,
without notice to the other side, accelerated a hearing date so as
to cut off a legitimate right to amend, [citation omitted], the
magistrate has the inherent power to restore that right to the
prosecution by refusing to accept the plea and granting a short
continuance.
70. 138 Cal. App. 3d 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
71. See id. at 352.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 352-53.
75. See Cronk, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 353.
76. See id.
77. See id; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1999).
78. See Cronk, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 353 (the defendant was arrested in Idaho
and extradited to California to stand trial for murder).




The purpose of Section 859a, [subdivision] (a) is to allow a
speedy process for defendants and eliminate unnecessary
procedural niceties to allow the efficient disposition of criminal
matters. It was never designed to allow defendants to use
surreptitious calendar changes to defeat the right of the People
to amend to allege what may very well be just and proper
charges of criminal activity. 8'
While probing the limits of Penal Code Section 859a(a), Cronk
generally reinforced its mandatory nature." It was the surprise
induced by the dubious defense tactic in accelerating the
arraignment date that warranted the amended filing.83 To that
extent, Cronk does carve a "dubious defense tactic" exception from
Penal Code Section 859a(a). Perhaps as significant as what Cronk
held was what it did not hold. Specifically, the development of
additional evidence was not a factor in the court's decision.' 4
Although the prosecutor specifically requested to amend the
complaint to allege special circumstances due to new evidence that
had come to light since the filing of the original complaint,85 the
court failed to address this issue in its opinion, instead relying solely
on the fact that the defense had engaged in tactics that the Attorney
General characterized as "Gamesmanship and all that Jazz."' This
leaves open the issue of whether newly discovered evidence can
serve as an exception to Section 859a(a)'s mandate.
Two years later in People v. Reza,7 the California Court of
Appeal had another opportunity to examine the defendant's right
to plead guilty. Reza was charged with an October 1981 burglary
and with a November 1982 attempted burglary.' On the trial date,
Reza moved to change his plea to the attempted burglary charge
from not guilty to guilty.89 Because the evidence supporting the
attempted burglary charge was very strong while the evidence for
the burglary charge was relatively weak, Reza sought to stand trial
for only the burglary charge by pleading guilty to the attempted
81. See id. at 354 (adopting in part the opinion of the trial judge denying the
defendant's writ of habeas corpus from which the present appeal was taken).
82. See id.
83. See Cronk,138 Cal. App. 3d at 354.
84. See id. at 353 & n.1, 354.
85. See id. at 353 & n.1.
86. See id. at 354 & n.2.
87. 152 Cal. App. 3d 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
88. See id. at 650.
89. See id. at 650-51.
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burglary.9 The trial judge, at the urging of the prosecutor, refused
the plea.9' Reza appealed.'
The California appellate court held that the trial judge should
have accepted the plea and concluded that "it is error to reject a
competent defendant's offer of an unconditional plea of guilty in a
non-capital case where there is a factual basis for the plea."93 The
court determined that "[t]he decision as to how to plead is personal
to the defendant. 9 4 "But 'the legislature has the power to regulate,
in the public interest, the manner in which that choice is exer-
cised.' ""
The court then noted that, in non-capital cases, a guilty plea
could be rejected " 'to protect defendants against the consequences
of their own folly or neglect.' " While acknowledging that
limitation, the Reza court properly noted that " '[a] court does not
have unlimited power to either refuse. to accept, or to vacate, a
guilty plea.' "' " 'Thus it is the legislative prerogative to specify
which pleas the defendant may elect to enter, when he may do so,
where and how he must plead, and what the effects are of making
or not making certain pleas.' "98
Much like Cronk, Reza's attempt to plead guilty was an
attempt to manipulate the system, yet the court still held that
Reza's guilty plea was wrongly rejected.' The Reza court found
that the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Hall'°
"cut the underpinnings" of any discretion to reject a valid guilty
plea. 101
90. See id. at 651.
91. See id.
92. See Reza, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 651.
93. See id. at 654 (the error did not require reversal as it was found harmless).
94. Id. at 651 (citing In re Williams, 1 Cal. 3d 168, 177 & n.8 (Cal. 1969)).
95. Id. at 651 (quoting People v. Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d 739, 747-48 (Cal. 1981)).
96. See id. at 652 (quoting Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d at 751 n.8) (discussing how a
guilty plea that is knowingly and voluntarily entered can be properly rejected if the
court finds that there is no proper factual basis for that plea).
97. See Reza, 152 Cal. App.3d at 652 (quoting People v. Thompson, 10 Cal.
App. 3d. 129, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)).
98. Id. at 651 (quoting Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d at 747-48) (internal citations
omitted).
99. See id. at 654. It should further be noted, however, that the dubious
defense tactic in Reza was relatively minor when compared to the tactic used in
Cronk.
100. 616 P.2d 826 (Cal. 1980).
101. See Reza, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 654.
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III. Review of Other Jurisdictions
Given the paucity of judicial interpretation of California's
Penal Code Section 859a(a), a review of the law of other
jurisdictions may shed insight on the dilemma Michaels's plea
created and may suggest some alternative approaches that would
prevent such a scenario from occurring again."
What then of other jurisdictions? Is the California approach
typical or atypical? A comparative approach should lend breadth
of perspective to this fairly narrow issue. To that end, we have
selected several jurisdictions which have confronted problems
similar to the Michaels scenario. Specifically, we looked to the laws
of Massachusetts, Florida, and New York to see how the courts and
legislatures of those states have dealt with this issue.
Massachusetts law reads similarly to California's. Massachu-
setts Rule 12 of Criminal Procedure reads:
(a) Entry of Pleas.
(1) Pleas Which May Be Entered and by Whom. A defendant
may plead not guilty, or guilty, or with the consent of the judge,
nolo contendere, to any crime with which he has been charged
and over which the court has jurisdiction. A plea of guilty or
nolo contendere shall be received only from the defendant
himself except pursuant to the provisions of Rule 18. Pleas shall
be received in open court and the proceedings shall be recorded
where facilities for recording are available. If a defendant refuses
to plead or if the judge refuses to accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, a plea of not guilty shall be entered.'0 3
(2) Acceptance of Plea of Guilty or Nolo Contendere. A judge
may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. He
shall not accept such a plea without first determining that the
plea is made voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of
the charge and the consequences of the plea.1°4
Subsection (2) appears to clarify the last sentence of subsection
(1), in that subsection (2) explains the circumstances under which a
judge must not accept a plea of guilty. Not surprisingly the judge
must refuse the plea if it is not knowingly and voluntarily made.
102. See infra notes 103 to 159 and accompanying text; see also Section VI of
this article, Proposed Modification to Existing California Law.
103. Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(a)(1) (West 1995) (emphasis added).
104. Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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Furthermore, Rule 12 (c)(5)(A) reads:
(5) Hearing on Plea; Acceptance. The judge shall conduct a
hearing to determine the voluntariness of the plea and the
factual basis of the charge.
(A) Factual Basis for Charge. A judge shall not accept a plea of
guilty unless he is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the
charge. The failure of the defendant to acknowledge all of the
elements of the factual basis shall not preclude a judge from
accepting a guilty plea. Upon a showing of cause the tender of
the guilty plea and the acknowledgment of the factual basis of
the charge may be made on the record at the bench105
Again, not surprisingly, the trial judge must reject a guilty plea
if he is not satisfied as to the factual basis for the plea. From a plain
reading of Rule 12, it requires judicial acceptance of a guilty plea if
the plea is entered knowingly, voluntarily, and with a factual basis.
The few appellate cases that have arisen in Massachusetts
under Rule 12 are consistent with this proposition. A
Massachusetts appellate court in Commonwealth v. Kelleher'"
upheld the trial court's refusal to accept a guilty plea. In Kelleher,
the defendant was indicted for various crimes including breaking
and entering, possession of burglarious instruments, assault and
battery with a dangerous weapon, and assault with intent to rape.' 07
Kelleher had prior convictions for rape, armed robbery, and armed
burglary."° In exchange for a lenient sentencing recommendation
from the prosecutor, the defendant attempted to plead guilty to all
four counts.9 His guilty plea was rejected by the trial judge.110
Kelleher went to trial and a jury convicted him on all of the charged
counts. "'
Kelleher involved a plea negotiation between Kelleher and the
prosecution that was found unacceptable by the trial court."2
105. Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(5)(A).
106. 547 N.E.2d 56 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
107. See id. at 57.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 57 & n.2. While it is not clear from the record why the trial judge
chose to reject Kelleher's plea, it appears that the judge, concerned with Kelleher's
prior criminal record, determined that the terms of the best-interest plea did not
provide for a severe enough sentence. Apparently, the judge wanted an upward
departure from the plea agreement and felt constrained to reject the plea rather
than accept it with the attached conditions.




Kelleher had conditioned his guilty plea to a particular sentencing
recommendation. The appeals court held:
The defendant argues that the judge is bound to accept the
recommendation to the same extent the prosecutor is bound to
honor the promises he made during plea negotiations. The
defendant's argument is off the mark. "[T]his is not a situation
where the prosecutor reneged on his promises." [Citations
omitted.] The judge made no promises to the defendant prior to
the hearing and in the exercise of sound judicial discretion
rejected the defendant's guilty plea. 113
Kelleher, unlike Michaels, involved a plea negotiation.
Kelleher's guilty plea was conditioned on the trial court's
acceptance of the sentencing recommendation. Given such
circumstances, of course "[t]he acceptance of a guilty plea is within
the discretion of the trial judge.""' To hold otherwise is to deny the
judge his rightful role in the sentencing process.
Kelleher provides no additional insight to Rule 12. It would
seem, however, from Kelleher and the statute that the previously
described proposition could be expanded to the following: Rule 12
renders judicial acceptance of a plea mandatory if the plea is
entered with a factual basis knowingly, voluntarily, and
unconditionally.
Two further appellate cases arising in Massachusetts confirm
the plain language and intent of Rule 12. In Commonwealth v.
Dilone"5 and Commonwealth v. Del Verde"6 the court upheld the
right of trial judges to refuse pleas as set forth in Rule 12.
In Dilone, the judge refused to accept the defendant's guilty
plea to a second-degree murder charge because the judge
determined that there was no factual basis for the plea."7 At the
time Dilone attempted to plead guilty, he testified under oath that
he did not kill the victim, did not point the gun at the victim and did
not know how the gun was discharged."' As such, the judge's
refusal of the guilty plea in Dilone was mandated by the language of
Rule 12(c)(5)(A). It did not involve a purely discretionary
determination by the trial judge.
113. Id. at 58 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 57.
115. 431 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1982).
116. 496 N.E.2d 1357 (Mass. 1986).
117. See Dilone, 431 N.E.2d at 579-80 (citing Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(5)(A)).
118. See id. at 579.
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Similarly, in Del Verde, the trial court refused a guilty plea not
as a matter of discretion but as a matter of law. Del Verde, a
mentally retarded 18 year old, had spent most of his life either in
mental institutions or in foster homes."9 Following his arrest, he
confessed to murder and rape. He was then ordered to be
evaluated to determine whether he was competent to stand trial .
After several evaluations, Del Verde was ultimately determined to
be incompetent to stand trial.12 ' Through defense counsel and his
guardian he was able to reach a plea bargain with the district
attorney whereby he would plead guilty to the lesser offense of
manslaughter. 122 The parties sought to enter the plea by use of the
doctrine of substituted judgment. 123  The trial judge refused to
accept Del Verde's guilty plea.2
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
upheld the rejection of the plea." That court determined that a
guilty plea proffered by a mentally incompetent defendant would
be invalid because it would not be knowingly and voluntarily
entered.26 Accordingly, the trial judge could not accept the plea in
light of Rule 12(a)(2) and the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Boykin v. Alabama.127 Pursuant to Massachusetts Rule
119. See Del Verde, 469 N.E.2d at 1358.
120. See id. at 1359.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. As the court in Del Verde stated:
The doctrine of substituted judgment originated in England to authorize
a gift from the estate of an incompetent person to an individual to whom
the incompetent owed no duty of support. The doctrine first appeared in
this Commonwealth in legislation empowering the probate court to
authorize a conservator or guardian to formulate and administer an
estate plan for an incompetent. The first common law application in
Massachusetts of the substituted judgment doctrine was in Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, in which we approved the
withholding of life-prolonging medical treatment to an elderly mentally
retarded person suffering from acute myeloblastic monocytic leukemia.
To our knowledge... all subsequent cases in Massachusetts in which
substituted judgment has been used have involved either the withholding
or forced administration of medical treatment.
Id. at 1361 (citations omitted).
124. See Del Verde, 469 N.E.2d at 1359.
125. See id. at 1366.
126. See id. at 1360-61.
127. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). In Boykin, the United States Supreme Court held
that when a trial court accepts a guilty plea, it should ensure that the record
reflects that the defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his constitutional
rights to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and those protecting
against compulsory self-incrimination. Id. at 242-43.
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12 the right to reject a guilty plea is limited to those instances
specifically set forth in that Rule.
Much like Massachusetts, Florida procedure provides that a
"defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or, with consent of the
court, nolo contendere.' 28  Like the Massachusetts Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Florida law further provides that a court shall
reject a guilty plea if it is not knowingly and voluntarily proffered. 9
Also like Massachusetts, Florida law commands that the judge must
find a factual basis for the plea.3° Additionally, Florida's law
dictates that "[w]hen an indictment or information charges an
offense that is divided into degrees without specifying the degree, if
the defendant pleads guilty, generally the court shall, before
accepting the plea, examine witnesses to determine the degree of
the offense of which the defendant is guilty.''
Florida's scheme appears to mirror the mandatory nature of
California's law. 132  However, as with the California and
Massachusetts statutes, it remains for Florida's appellate courts to
more fully shape and hone the legislative effort. Unfortunately, the
case law from Florida does not provide a clear answer as to whether
a defendant has the absolute right to enter a plea of guilty when the
plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered and there is a factual
basis for the plea.
13
In the case of State ex rel Schieres v. Nimmons,3 1 the District
Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, held that the acceptance
of a plea of guilty is a discretionary act on the part of the trial judge
and mandamus would not issue to force the trial judge to accept a
validly offered plea of guilty. 3 The defendant was charged with
second-degree murder and sought to enter a guilty plea to that
charge because the prosecutor was going to go before the grand
jury to seek an indictment against the defendant for first degree
murder.136 The trial court found that the attempt to plea was a
tactical maneuver on the part of the defense, "designed to forestall
the possibility of the Grand Jury's returning an indictment of
128. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.170(a) (West 1999).
129. Id. 3.170(k).
130. See id. 3.172(a).
131. Id. 3.170(i); cf CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192 (West 1999).
132. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.170; cf CAL. PENAL CODE § 859a(a).
133. See infra notes 134 to 152 and accompanying text.
134. 364 So.2d 1262 (Fla. App. 1978).
135. See id.
136. See id. In Florida, first-degree murder constitutes a capital felony. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West Supp. 2000).
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murder in the first degree. '37 Rather than base its ruling on state
law, the appellate court looked to the United States Supreme
Court's decisions38 in Santobello v. New York'39 and Lynch v.
Overholser140 to hold that "[t]here is, of course, no absolute right to
have a guilty plea accepted ... A court may reject a plea in
exercise of sound judicial discretion."'l
4
Seventeen years later, in Rigabar v. Broome,142 the District
Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, explicitly held that
"[w]hen the plea is knowing and voluntary, when there is a factual
foundation to support it, when the state has agreed to it, then the
discretion has ended and the plea must be accepted., 143  Rigabar
involved a defendant charged with lewd assault 4 and attempt to
commit a lewd act.14 Rigabar wanted to avoid trial because the
alleged victim in the case was his step-granddaughter.1 4 6 Rigabar
thought it would be in his "best interest" to plead guilty to the
charges and not have his step granddaughter testify against him in
open court. While he wanted to plead guilty, Rigabar did not want
to admit that he was guilty of actually committing the crimes
charged.
1 47
When the trial judge refused to accept the plea because he did
not believe in best interest pleas, the appellate court ordered him to
137. Schieres, 364 So.2d at 1263.
138. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no
constitutional right to plead guilty. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971) (holding that under federal law there is no absolute right to have a guilty
plea accepted and a court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial
discretion); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962) (same). Accordingly, any
right of defendants to plead guilty must be granted by state law. See North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). "[T~he States may by statute or otherwise
confer [the right to plead guilty]. Likewise, the States may bar their courts from
accepting guilty pleas from any defendants who assert their innocence." Id. at 38
n. 11; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 859a(a) (West 1999); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172
(West 1999); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12(a)(1) (West 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 220.10(2)
(Lawyers Co-op. 1996).
139. 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (affirming the notion that under federal law there is no
absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted and a court may reject a plea in
exercise of sound judicial discretion).
140. 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962). (holding that under federal law there is no
absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted and a court may reject a plea in
exercise of sound judicial discretion)
141. See Schieres, 364 So.2d at 1263 (quoting Santobella, 404 U.S. at 262).
142. 658 So.2d 1038 (Fla. App. 1995).
143. Id. at 1041.
144. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.04(1) (West Supp. 2000).
145. See id. §§ 777.04(1), 800.04(2).




comply with the legislative mandate of Section 3.172 (d) and accept
the plea.148  The appellate court reasoned that "a judge cannot
refuse a concession to a judgment of guilt merely because the trial
judge does not like" 'best interest' " pleas.
149
The Rigabar court distinguished the case from Schieres on the
fact that the prosecution agreed to the plea in one (Rigabar) but not
in the other (Schieres)"' But, as noted by the Rigabar court on
rehearing, the concession by the state of agreeing to the plea,
"amounts to no concession at all, if the defendant has the right
under rule 3.172 to plead without admitting guilt.''. Thus, the
Rigabar court affirmed the mandate of Florida's statutory scheme
while trying to avoid expressed disagreement with Schieres.
However, if the agreement of the prosecution is the only
distinguishing factor between the two cases, then either Rigabar
implicitly adds prosecutorial consent to the requirements of Rule
3.172, or Schieres was wrongly decided. One possible way to
reconcile the two cases is to also view the trial judge in Schieres as
applying some type of exception for dubious defense tactics in his
discretionary rejection of the plea.'52
In any event, in Florida, we have at least one case (Schieres)
that seems to contradict the statutory scheme governing the
acceptance of guilty pleas. Perhaps this is because the statute itself
is not clear in its mandate. As such, the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure are not particularly helpful in resolving the pending
question.
More instructive than either the Massachusetts or Florida law
is New York's Criminal Procedure Section 220.10. Section
220.10(2) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subdivision (5), the
defendant may as a matter of right enter a plea of "guilty" to the
entire indictment.'5 3 The exceptions set forth in subdivision five
include cases where, like Kurt Michaels's, the defendant is charged
with murder in the first degree.' New York's definition of first
degree murder is similar to California's murder with special
148. See id. at 1041.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 1041, n.6 ("We distinguish this case from State ex rel. Schieres v.
Nimmons [citation omitted] where the plea was not agreeable to the prosecutor,
who opposed it.").
151. See Rigabar, 658 So.2d at 1042 (clarifying that defendants do not have the
right to plead guilty when that plea is conditional in any way).
152. See State ex rel. Schieres v. Nimmons, 364 So.2d 1262, 1263 (Fla. App.
1978); cf. Cronk v. Municipal Court, 138 Cal. App. 3d 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
153. N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 220.10(2) (Lawyers Co-op. 1996) (emphasis added).
154. See id. § 220.10(5).
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circumstances allegations."' As such, the New York law does
nothing to temper filing decisions. Either the prosecutor must
allege murder in the first degree (capital murder) or risk a best
interest plea by the defendant. Thus, in New York, as in California,
the decision to allege special circumstances amounts to nothing
more than the ubiquitous "race to the courthouse." However, the
New York statute is clear on its face: unless the case falls within one
of the specifically enumerated exceptions, the defendant may plead
guilty as a matter of right.156
From a review of the statutory and case authority of the
jurisdictions that we have examined, it appears reasonably clear
that there is a right to plead guilty to the existing charge. However,
also as evidenced by these jurisdictions, that right has important
limitations: the plea must be voluntary and knowing;17 there must
be a factual basis for the plea;56 and the plea must be unconditional
to the then-pending charge. "9
IV. California Law as Applied to Michaels
While the state of the law in California may not be ideal for
implementing the competing dynamics of allowing a defendant to
plead guilty to the charges pending while at the same time allowing
the prosecutor to make tempered filing decisions, Penal Code
Section 859a(a) is clear in its mandate; unless a case falls within one
of the specific judicially mandated exceptions,' the defendant may
plead guilty as a matter of law to the then-pending charges. As
such, California falls in line with the other jurisdictions considered.
Both statutory and case law in California are clear. 6' A
defendant may plead guilty to all charges and when he does, all that
remains is the pronouncement of judgment and sentencing. There
is no requirement that the prosecutor consent to a guilty plea.'62
155. Compare N.Y. PENAL § 125.27 (Lexis 1998); with CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.2 (West 1999).
156. See N.Y. CRIM. P. § 220.10.
157. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Rigabar v. Broome, 658
So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. App. 1995); Commonwealth v. Del Verde, 496 N.E.2d 1357,
1360-61 (Mass. 1986).
158. See People v. Reza, 152 Cal. App. 3d 647, 654 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Dilone, 431 N.E.2d 576, 579-80 (Mass. 1981); MASS. R. CRIM. P.
12(c)(5)(A) (West 1995); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172(a)(West Supp. 2000).
159. See Commonwealth v. Kelleher, 547 N.E.2d 56, 57 & n.2 (Mass. App. Ct.
1989); Reza, 152 Cal. App.3d at 654.
160. See supra notes 40-101 and accompanying text.
161. See id.
162. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016, subdiv. 1 (West 1999); People v. Superior
Court (Smith), 82 Cal. App. 3d 909 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
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Section 859a(a), as amended in 1970, does not require prosecutorial
concurrence or judicial acceptance of guilty pleas.163
Penal Code Section 859a(a) sets forth the procedure by which
a defendant may enter a guilty plea. When the statutory procedure
set forth in Section 859a(a) is followed, the guilty plea must be
accepted. " Once a guilty plea is entered, the prosecution may not
amend the complaint to include new charges based on the same
facts.
165
Under California Penal Code Section 859a(a), a guilty plea to a
lesser-included offense may be rejected by either the judge or the
prosecutor. However, Michaels's guilty plea was not to a lesser-
included offense. Michaels pled guilty to the murder count pending
against him. He admitted all of the murder-related allegations with
which he was charged. It is without merit to characterize the
murder charge then pending against Michaels as a lesser-included
offense.' 66 At the time he elected to plead guilty to the murder
count, Michaels faced no greater charge.
The California Supreme Court has made it clear that "[a]
person cannot be convicted of an offense ... not charged against
him... whether or not there was evidence at his trial to show that
he committed that offense.' ' 167  Thus, without regard to the
prosecution's stated intent to later amend the complaint to allege
special circumstances, under California law, Michaels had an
absolute right to plead guilty to the only murder charge pending
against him at that time.
Judge Burley based his characterization of Michaels's plea as
to a lesser-included offense on an erroneous interpretation of the
law. Judge Burley stated that "[b]y the nature of the laws of
163. Section 859a(a) used to have a consent requirement for the acceptance of
guilty pleas. However, that requirement was removed by legislative amendment in
1970. The 1970 amendments were initiated by then-Assemblyman Ken
MacDonald at the request of Woodruff J. Deem who at the time was the District
Attorney of Ventura County. Mr. Deem was concerned because the then-current
version of Section 859a(a) at that time did not contain a provision for the taking of
a plea of nolo contendere. As such, many magistrates refused to accept nolo
contendere pleas because they did not think that they had the duty to do so. When
the provision for the acceptance of a plea of nolo contendere with the prosecutor's
consent was added to Section 859a(a), the requirement for consent to a guilty plea
was removed. There is nothing in the legislative history of Section 859a(a), as
amended, to indicate the rationale for this change.
164. See Reza, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 653.
165. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1009 (West Supp. 2000).
166. In Michaels, the judge, district attorney, and attorney general all
characterized Michaels's plea as one to a lesser-included offense.
167. See In re Hess, 288 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1955).
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pleading... if I permit a plea to the court as it is stated, it is second
degree .... [I]f you don't know when you take a plea, by law it
becomes the lesser offense."' 6
The Judge was wrong. The court had the discretion and indeed
the duty to determine the degree of murder itself before passing
sentence,1 69 but it did not have the discretion to refuse the plea."'°
Section 1192 of the Penal Code provides that "upon a plea of
guilty.., of a crime or attempted crime distinguished or divided
into degrees, the court must, before passing sentence, determine the
degree. '171
It is only where the court fails to set the degree that the plea is
deemed to be to the lesser degree crime.1 2 Michaels's plea was to
the face of the complaint and would have subjected him to a
sentence of first or second degree murder; the choice was the
court's to make.' The plea was not to a lesser-included offense and
Judge Burley's application of the discretionary portion of Penal
Code Section 859a(a) was erroneous.
Kurt Michaels's plea falls more accurately within that part of
Section 859a(a) dealing with pleas "to the offense charged.
1 74
Pursuant to the plain language of that section, a magistrate must
accept a defendant's guilty plea to a charged offense, provided that
the defendant has counsel present at the time of pleading. 175 Here,
Michaels had counsel present and pled guilty to a pending charged
offense. 6 Judge Burley had no discretion to reject Kurt Michaels's
plea.177
V. Prosecutorial Discretion
It is curious, given the mandatory language of Penal Code
Section 859a(a), that any district attorney contemplating capital
charges would risk an early plea to a non-capital murder charge.
168. Transcript supra note 2, at 32-33.
169. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192 (West 1999).
170. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 859a(a).
171. CAL. PENALCODE § 1192.
172. See id.
173. See id.; see, e.g., In re James, 38 Cal. 2d 302, 304-12 (Cal. 1952); People v.
Mendez, 27 Cal. 2d 20 (Cal. 1945).
174. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 859a(a) (West 1999).
175. See id.; see also People v. Reza, 152 Cal. App.3d 647, 654 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that it is error not to accept a competent defendant's unconditional
plea of guilty in a non-capital case where there is a factual basis for the plea).
176. See Transcript supra note 2, at 4.
177. See Reza, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 654; People v. Bas, 194 Cal. App. 3d 878,
880-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
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Yet the practice was in place in 1988 when Kurt Michaels
attempted to plea, and the practice is in place today.'78 The safe
route would have prosecutors initially filing capital charges given
any possibility that capital charges might ultimately be charged.
However, such a practice may well run counter to the exercise of
sound prosecutorial discretion.
Section 859a(a) allows a defendant to plead guilty to the
pending charge against him and for all imaginable scenarios save
those cases where capital charges are still being considered. Section
859a(a) is sound law. However, in the potential capital case, where
the need for full and careful prosecutorial deliberation should be at
its utmost, Section 859a(a) virtually binds the hands of the
prosecutor. The very essence of prosecutorial discretion is to
permit that degree of flexibility necessary "to do the right thing."
The "one rule fits all" mode of Section 859a(a) renders a disservice
to the notion of careful and thoughtful deliberation in making
capital filing decisions.
Apart from any specific statute or any particular appellate
court decision, the search for a solution to the problem raised in the
Michaels case may lie in the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion.
We cannot fix what has already occurred. 79 However, we can look
to the future and suggest a methodology that will allow for
maximum prosecutorial discretion while still adhering to the
common sense notion, and indeed the statutory and case authority,
that one accused of a crime may plead guilty to that crime.
However, prior to setting forth any suggested revisions to
California's Penal Code, we should examine the genesis, scope, and
importance of prosecutorial discretion. This discretion is the key
element which allows our criminal justice system to adapt to the
various factual situations with which it is faced.' °
"The prosecutor's decision to institute criminal charges is the
broadest and least regulated power in American criminal law. The
judicial deference shown to prosecutors generally is most noticeablewith respect to the charging function.' 81 This function is one of the
most important exercised by prosecutors. "No government official
178. A cursory survey of various California counties has shown that several
District Attorneys' offices are still following the filing practices utilized by the San
Diego District Attorney in the Michaels case.
179. The California Supreme Court will, of course, use the law as it existed in
1988 in deciding the fate of Kurt Michaels.
180. See Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI.
L. REV. 427 (1960).
181. Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's Exercise of
the Charging Discretion, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 513 (1993)
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can effect a greater influence over a citizen than the prosecutor who
charges that citizen with a crime."'"
The source of prosecuting officials' discretionary power varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The authority of prosecutors is
detailed in state constitutions of thirty-three states 3 including
Florida," 4 New York,'85 and Texas&6 In Illinois"s and eleven other
states, authority for local prosecutors is statutorily provided.'18 In
California, the criminal charging function of prosecutors is derived
from both a constitutional article and a statute. Article VI, Section
20 of the California Constitution provides, "[t]he style of all process
shall be 'The People of the State of California' and all prosecutions
shall be conducted in their name and by their authority."' 9
"Government Code Section 26500 states that the district attorney is
the public prosecutor. He shall attend the courts, and conduct on
behalf of the People all prosecution for public offenses.''9° As one
court noted, "[t]his tandem of a constitutional and statutory
authority has found application in a number of cases which under
varying circumstances appear to recognize, albeit obliquely, the
requirement that criminal prosecutions require the district
attorney's approval for their institution.' 91
The discretion of prosecutors to charge criminals has been
interpreted very broadly. In the federal criminal justice system as
in most state schemes, the government retains "broad discretion" as
to whom to prosecute.' 92 "[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable
cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge
to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his
discretion."'93  Thus, while the sources of their authority vary,
prosecutors have very broad discretion in determining if and what
charges to file.
182. Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992
BYU L. REv. 671 (1992).
183. See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 732 (1996).
184. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 17.
185. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 13(a).
186. See TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 65.
187. See ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 19.
188. See Misner, supra note 183, at 732.
189. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 20.
190. CAL. Gov. CODE § 26500 (West 1988).
191. People v. Ventura County, 27 Cal. App. 3d 193, 201 (1972).
192. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 (1982).
193. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
20001
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
However, this vast discretionary power of prosecutors is not
without its detractors, some of whom claim that judicial review or
legislative constraints ought to be implemented.'94 In support of
such limitation, Douglas Noll states several rationales for
controlling prosecutors' discretion. He claims that "[b]y giving the
prosecutor virtually uncontrolled screening discretion, the
possibility that like persons in like circumstances will be treated
differently is increased.... Thus, individual defendants may suffer
from inconsistency in screening decisions." '195 The power to invoke
charges and to determine which charges to file translates into a
power to determine if and how citizens will be punished. "Giving
prosecutors the power to invoke or deny punishment at their
discretion raises the prospect that society's most fundamental
sanctions will be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously and that the
least favored members of the community - racial and ethnic
minorities, social outcasts, the poor - will be treated most
harshly."196
Courts have considered the implementation of constraints on
prosecutorial discretion. The Supreme Court in United States v.
Batchelder upheld the prosecutor's discretion in a case involving a
defendant who was convicted and sentenced under one of two
statutes that forbade the possession of a firearm.97 The defendant
claimed that because he was charged under the statute which
authorized the greater punishment, his constitutional rights were
violated.' 9  The Court upheld the prosecutor's decision stating,
"whether to prosecute and what charges to file or bring before a
grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's
discretion.""9
In Wayte v. United States,2" the Supreme Court held that the
decision of whether or not to prosecute is ill-suited to judicial
review because prosecutors have to take into consideration many
factors - the strength of a case, the deterrence value of a
prosecution, and the case's relationship to the government's
enforcement priorities - which a court could not competently
194. See Douglas Noll, Controlling a Prosecutor's Discretion Through Fuller
Enforcement, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 697, 698 (1978).
195. Id.
196. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1521, 1555 (1981).
197. 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979).
198. See id. at
199. Id. at 123-24.
200. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
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undertake.20 ' The above cases reflect that few courts are willing to
limit prosecutorial discretion absent a showing of abuse."
The policies in favor of maintaining broad discretionary power
have been outlined by scholars, practitioners, and the courts.
Limited resources, systematic costs, separation of powers, and the
desire for individualized justice are important policy considerations
which support maintaining broad discretion in prosecuting
officials.
One of the strongest arguments in favor of broad prosecutorial
charging discretion is the idea of individualized justice.
"Significantly curtailing prosecutorial discretion would accomplish
consistency at the cost of individualized justice."2°" "This type of
discretion [case specific assessment] is not only inevitable but also
desirable., 20 5 Eliminating or curtailing case specific evaluations by
prosecutors does not limit discretion but places it solely in the
hands of police.2°6 Predetermined rules, which do not allow for
prosecutorial decisions, decrease the flexibility and sensitivity often
desirable in criminal proceedings."l "It [prosecutorial discretion]
permits a prosecutor in dealing with individual cases to consider
special facts and circumstances not taken into account by the
applicable rules.""2 For example, a Massachusetts gun-control law
imposed mandatory one-year jail terms for possession of an
unlicensed handgun.2° One of the first persons to be prosecuted
under that statute was an elderly woman passing out religious
leaflets from a bag that contained her lunch and a gun she felt that
she needed for protection.20 Because prosecutorial discretion had
been limited, the court had to find another pretext for dismissing
the case.211 This type of judicial action undermines the criminal
justice system. Many cases require flexibility in charging in order to
avoid absurd and damaging results.
201. See id. at 607.
202. See ABRAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEAS 52-75 (1981).
203. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assist-
ance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 105, 159 (1994).
204. Melilli, supra note 182, at 674.
205. Id. at 675.
206. See id.
207. See Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1971).
208. Id.
209. See Vorenberg, supra note 196, at 1551 (quoting BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3,






[o]ne sense of justice demands that similarly situated people be
treated alike; another demands that each man be treated
according to his desserts. The first sense of justice demands that
definitions of crimes be stated generally and be applied to all
similarly situated persons; the second demands that these
general rules be flexible enough to allow for variations in
individual circumstance. Eventually someone must give
meaning to the words of the law, and that interpretation process
inevitably involves substantial discretionary elements.
212
In addition to case specific considerations, the law itself may be
flawed and require discretionary decisions in order to avoid unduly
harsh enforcement. "Discretion protects citizens from the excessive
breadth or antiquated nature of the substantive criminal law. Not
all laws currently on the books are realistically intended to be
enforced.'2 3 Discretion is necessary because it is difficult for the
legislature to tailor laws precisely to the various facts that may be
relevant in a pending case; 214 decisions must be made by
administrators of criminal law about the method and direction of
the prosecution.215 Discretion is also necessary because it is difficult
to adapt statutory law quickly to changes in public attitudes.216
Every jurisdiction grants broad discretion to prosecuting
officials. Limited resources, the doctrine of separation of powers,
and the desire to maintain a flexible justice system have convinced
courts and legislators that prosecuting officials must retain broad
discretion in the charging function. Never is the proper use of that
discretion more true than when contemplating capital charges.
Prosecutorial discretion is requisite in factoring in the myriad
considerations in bringing capital charges and the prosecutor should
be allowed maximum input prior to that decision. In the proper use
of their discretion, prosecutors should be permitted to push back
the charging decision as far as possible in these cases to gain
optimum knowledge and perspective. And that is presumably what
the San Diego District Attorney was attempting in the case of Kurt
Michaels. However, Michaels's plea preempted that careful
obligation. The District Attorney should have been permitted
212. Arthur Rosett, Discretion, Severity and Legality in Criminal Justice, 46 S.
CAL. L. REV. 12, 20 (1972).
213. Wayne A. Logan, A Proposed Check on the Charging Discretion of
Wisconsin Prosecutors, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1695, 1721 (1990).
214. See Abrams, supra note 207, at 3.
215. See People v. Golz, 368 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (Ill. 1977).
216. See Abrams, supra note 207, at 3.
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additional time yet was precluded by the structure of California
law.
VI. Proposed Modification to Existing California Law
Section 859a(a) of the California Penal does not permit that
degree of discretion and flexibility necessary in murder cases with
capital potential. The rigid nature of Section 859a(a) may force
prosecutors into early filing decisions that ultimately may not be
appropriate to the circumstances. It is in society's best interest to
have a California law that allows greater flexibility in making
capital-filing decisions. Section 859a(a), as currently written,
precludes that necessary flexibility. With but modest modification
of Section 859a the early plea concern should be eradicated. We
propose that the Amendment to Section 859a be as follows:
Section 859a (changes in bold)
(a) If the public offense charged is a felony not punishable
with death, the magistrate shall immediately upon the appearance
of counsel for the defendant read the complaint to the defendant
and ask him or her whether he or she pleads guilty or not guilty to
the offense charged therein and to a previous conviction or
convictions of crime if charged. While the charge remains pending
before the magistrate and when the defendant's counsel is present,
except as provided in subdivision (c) of this section, the defendant
may as a matter of right plead guilty to the offense charged; if the
offense is one which may be distinguished or divided into degrees,
the magistrate shall determine the degree of the crime to which the
defendant is pleading.217 The defendant may, with the consent of
the magistrate and the district attorney or other counsel for the
people, plead nolo contendere to the offense charged or plead
guilty or nolo contendere to any other offense the commission of
which is necessarily included in that with which he or she is
charged, or to an attempt to commit the offense charged and to the
previous conviction or convictions of crime if charged upon a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere. The magistrate may then fix a
reasonable bail ....
(b) ....
(c) In a homicide case when the district attorney or other
counsel for the people files notice with the court and the defendant
that the district attorney or other counsel for the people has a good-
faith belief that special circumstances allegations may later be
217. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192 (West 1999).
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added to the charging document so as to make the defendant
eligible for the death penalty as provided in Section 190.2 of this
code, then the defendant may not plead guilty to the charged
offense unless the magistrate and the district attorney or other
counsel for the people consent to such a plea.
VII Conclusion
The San Diego District Attorney was put in an untenable
position in the Michaels case. It properly used its prosecutorial
discretion to delay and assess developments prior to the ultimate
filing decision. However, in carefully exercising restraint and
seeking maximum input prior to making the filing decision, the
district attorney ran the risk of an early plea to non-capital charges.
The district attorney should not have been put in that position.
It is our sense that the legislature was not cognizant of the problem
that occurred in Michaels. The proposed modification of Section
859a allows time for careful and thoughtful scrutiny and properly
restricts the right of the accused to plead guilty under the limited
circumstances presented.
By requiring the prosecutor to file notice with the court and
the defendant that death-qualifying charges may be sought, the
legislature can ensure that prosecutors are not forced to file death
penalty charges at early stages of proceedings when, in fact, such
charges may not be warranted. Of course, this process will erode
some of the rights that defendants currently have under Section
859a. However, those rights have already been de facto abolished
by prosecutors who overfile capital charges in order to avoid best
interest pleas and by judges who do not follow the mandate of the
existing statutory scheme.
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